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1 Introduction
Fiscal policy represents one of the key instruments by which public actions can impact
on deprivation and poverty. This can happen both through its impacts on growth and on
distribution. Fiscal policy is one of a number of important influences on growth rates
(Gemmell 2001), and other things being equal a sustained higher growth rate will
translate into faster poverty reduction. But fiscal policy is also one of the main
mechanisms by which policy impacts on distribution. It can achieve this by means of
static redistribution, depending on the patterns of public spending and revenue raising,
or through dynamic redistribution, through its influence on the distributional pattern of
growth (Killick 2002). Indeed fiscal policy is likely to play a central role in generating a
pro-poor pattern of growth, which other things being equal will be much more effective
at reducing poverty. Unfortunately all too little is known about its precise role in this.
This paper discusses issues that arise in trying to assess the impact of fiscal policy on
poverty, considering this question within a country, rather than on cross-country
evidence. Apart from their standard difficulties, the options for meaningful cross-
country comparisons are limited in this case, given variations across countries in
measures of fiscal policy and measures of poverty. Much more can be learnt from more
detailed assessments within countries, and these are in any case more closely linked to
policy issues. In discussing approaches to assessing the impact of fiscal policy on
poverty at the country level, this paper covers both appropriate methodologies and the
data requirements for their implementation.
It is structured as follows. The next section considers some of the channels through
which fiscal policy can impact on poverty, and discuss some of the issues that arise in
trying to assess this. Section 3 then presents a critical review of the most commonly
used method at present, benefit incidence analysis. This technique is relatively
straightforward to understand and to implement in practice, and is informative;
however, it suffers from a number of important limitations as a guide to policy.
Section 4 then discusses the potential for incorporating behavioural responses in
modelling the impact of fiscal policy, the non-consideration of which represented one of
the important limitations of the benefit incidence method. However, as this still leaves
several important questions unanswered, Section 5 briefly discusses some other
approaches to assessing the poverty impact of fiscal policy. Section 6 discusses the
related, though distinct, issue of monitoring the impact of fiscal policy on poverty in
reality, again considering the data requirements for this. Section 7 offers conclusions.
2 Issues in assessing the impact of fiscal policy on poverty
That this is a complex question is clear from the outset. Poverty is multi-dimensional in
nature, and its different aspects may be influenced by different factors. Fiscal policy
covers many different types of public expenditure and different ways of financing this.
And even when attention is focused on one component of fiscal policy (say expenditure
on primary education) and one aspect of poverty (say primary school enrolment), the
channels through which one affects the other are generally not straightforward.2
The experiences of poor communities themselves, as well as theoretical representations
of living standards in terms of capabilities (Sen 1985, 1999), confirm the
multidimensional nature of poverty and deprivation. These important dimensions
include human development (health, education), nutrition, consumption, income levels,
vulnerability and powerlessness. In general these different dimensions need to be
considered and measured separately (that is, no satisfactory single measure of
capabilities is currently available). This is desirable anyway given that different
dimensions are not always closely correlated within countries (Appleton and Song
1999), and may be influenced by different factors. In the present context, a given fiscal
policy measure may affect different aspects of poverty in different ways.
In assessing the poverty impacts of fiscal policy, it is equally important to consider both
public spending measures and the way they are financed, whether based on tax revenue
or deficit financing. The financing method will have poverty impacts just as will the
spending it finances. Hence it is incorrect and therefore meaningless to consider for
instance the impact of an increase in the overall level of public spending without
considering how this is to be financed; the poverty impact is the combination of the two
effects which may (probably will) operate in opposite directions. Of course this issue
does not arise in considering the impact of changing the composition of public spending
for a given overall level, for example increasing spending on primary education while
making a matching reduction on spending on higher education. Again though different
components of such a re-allocation may operate in opposite directions.
Changes in fiscal policy can take many different forms, each of which can have impacts
on some or all dimensions of poverty. Consider for instance an increase in public
spending. If this is financed through increased taxation this raises the issue of who bears
the burden of this; with deficit financing the issue of who bears its consequences
(increased inflation or interest rates, an increased debt burden) arises. The poverty
impact also depends on the nature of the spending. Increases in spending on basic health
and education are widely viewed as having beneficial impacts on human development
of the poor – though this needs to be considered in each specific case; if so this may be
complemented by other long-term or externality benefits. Increased spending on public
transfers or in-kind transfers (such as food subsidies) can have beneficial impacts on
income, nutrition etc. among the poor if these transfers effectively reach them. Other
types of increased public spending can also have strong poverty impacts, but the effects
are more indirect. This could apply for example to infrastructure development in poor
areas, to spending to uphold the legal process where this fails to benefit the poor, or
from measures to ensure security in former conflict zones. Such effects may be indirect,
but this does not necessarily mean that their poverty impact is small, or necessarily less
than that of the more direct effects.
Quantifying the various impacts of fiscal policy will be difficult in practice. This is
especially true of indirect effects, but is still true for more direct effects. One key
methodological issue is the question of the counterfactual. Available data may provide
information on different aspects of living standards for different groups at one or more
points in time (e.g. primary school enrolment), as well as information on fiscal policy
(e.g. spending on primary education) at the same time. But it is generally difficult to
establish the links between one and the other. Retaining the primary school example,
how much difference does the level of public spending make to the enrolment rate?
What would happen to enrolment rates if the level of spending was reduced? And what
would be the distributional pattern of the impact?3
Much existing analysis of the distributional impact of fiscal policy focuses on
identifying who receives the benefits of existing public spending in an area and/or pays
different taxes. Such studies do not really identify why some groups do or do not
benefit. Further (though related), this type of analysis usually does not consider
behavioural responses, in other words, how does behaviour change as a result of the
public spending, taxes, higher interest rates and so on? Some studies though have
addressed these questions; in general they require an approach based on modelling. The
next two sections discuss these issues in more detail.
3 Benefit-incidence analysis and its limitations
Inevitably it is easier to assess the poverty impact of some types of fiscal policy
measures than others. Assessment is easier for instance in the cases of direct transfers
paid to households (such as state pensions), taxes paid directly by households (some
commodity or income taxes), subsidies on items consumed by households (such as food
subsidies), public spending on education and health, or public employment creation. In
such cases the immediate impacts on households are fairly direct, and it is often possible
to quantify the first order effects. It is much harder to identify and measure the impacts
of fiscal policy measures that affect households through indirect channels (such as taxes
paid by producers, or spending on infrastructure). The vast majority of the analysis of
the poverty impact of fiscal policy has considered the more direct effects. Many
valuable and wide-ranging studies on the impact of public spending on poverty are
included in the volume edited by van de Walle and Nead (1995), and reference will be
made to several of these below.
The approach that has been most widely used in practice in assessing the distributional
impact of fiscal policy is the so-called ‘benefit incidence’ method.1 Here the impacts of
fiscal policy are generally measured in terms of the increments or reductions to income
or consumption they imply. Thus changes in welfare are measured in money-metric
terms; see Heltberg et al. 2001, for a good example of its application to public spending
in Mozambique. One reason for the popularity of this technique is that such calculations
are relatively easily done and its data requirements are relatively modest, in particular
requiring only a single cross-section of household or individual level data. This method
does however rely on a number of strong assumptions, one of the most important of
which is that those affected by the fiscal policy measures do not alter their behaviour as
a result. Both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence suggest that this is generally
not true, in which case the appropriate counterfactual is not being considered.
Nonetheless, benefit incidence analysis may still provide a reasonable estimate of the
first round, static, distributional incidence of an existing fiscal policy measure – though
note that it is focusing on its average rather than its marginal incidence (see below).
If fiscal policy measures can be translated into their monetary values for different
households, then a number of criteria can be applied in assessing the poverty impact. A
simple criterion is whether poor households are better off as a result of a given measure.
1 As Heltberg et al. (2001) note, this should more accurately be referred to as ‘beneficiary incidence
assessment’. The term benefit incidence assessment is retained here because of its widespread use in
the literature.4
But better measures are to consider the progressivity of the measure (do poor groups
benefit more than proportionately to their share of overall income or consumption, so
that the measure tends to reduce inequality?) or how well targeted the measures are (do
the poor benefit more in absolute terms relative to non-poor groups?). Benefit incidence
analysis typically focuses most on the last of these criteria, especially so for measures
that are intended to benefit the poor disproportionately, or at least in proportion.
The application of the method is best explained by considering specific fiscal policy
measures. Starting with one of the most straightforward, in the case of cash transfers, a
first order incidence analysis of the impact on income poverty simply requires knowing
the pre-transfer (or post-transfer) income distribution and the amount of transfers
received by each household. This information is available from most household surveys
that collect the information need to estimate household consumption or income. With
this it is possible to compare pre-transfer and post-transfer income distributions to
identify the distributional impact of the transfer; see for example, Jarvis and
Micklewright (1995) on family allowances in Hungary. Techniques of this type can be
used to identify the numbers of those who were income poor according to their pre-
transfer income that benefited from the transfer. In addition this is sufficient to identify
the numbers raised out of poverty by the transfer. Where transfers are targeted to
particular groups, such analysis can also be used in identifying the errors of targeting
(Cornia and Stewart 1995): the numbers that ought to benefit from a given transfer but
are not in fact receiving it, and of those receiving it that in fact should be ineligible.
The distributional impact of taxes on expenditure (e.g. commodity taxes) or income by
households can be assessed given knowledge of the tax structure and respectively of
their consumption pattern or earnings of taxable income (Younger 1993, Younger et al.
1999). A similar principle applies to assessing food subsidies, which of course are like
negative taxes, or food stamps. As with the cash transfers above, in both cases the pre-
and post- tax/subsidy distributions can be compared to see the overall effect on the
distribution of income, or specifically on the incomes of the poor (Grosh 1995a, 1995b).
Again, where food subsidies are intended to be targeted towards the poor (they often are
to a greater or lesser extent) such techniques can also be used to determine the extent of
targeting errors (Cornia and Stewart 1995). Indeed similar analysis is also possible
using alternative measures of poverty – how many of the poor (non-poor) according to a
given measure benefit (do not benefit) from a given food subsidy? However, using non-
monetary standard of living measures it will not be possible to quantity the magnitude
of the effect of the food subsidy.
In the case of commodity taxes or subsidies this can be used to examine the different
distributional impacts for different commodities; and this can be important information
in considering which subsidies to retain or which taxes to increase/reduce. To do this
requires information on consumption patterns, sources of taxable income etc. (as
appropriate), combined with estimates of overall income or consumption; again this
information is typically available in many household surveys.
Benefit incidence methods are also commonly used in assessing the distributional
impacts of public spending on health or education services (Meerman 1979, Selowsky
1979, Castro-Leal et al. 1999). Such spending is a subsidy in that those households
using the service are generally paying significantly below cost price, or sometimes
receiving it free. The extent of the subsidy depends on their extent of usage (e.g. the5
number of children being sent to primary school). Benefit incidence analysis translates
this into a monetary value (based on the estimated unit cost of provision) for all using
the service, viewing this as an increment to their income. In this way again it is possible
to look at the pattern of receipt of the subsidy according to the pre-subsidy income
distribution, so enabling an assessment of its distributional impact, including its impact
on the poor. This calculation requires data on the use of differently publicly subsidised
health and education facilities by households in different groups (these groups may be
defined based on consumption levels or according to other criteria); but it also requires
the information needed to calculate unit costs, which is not always easily done.
3.1 Evidence from benefit incidence studies
A recent review of evidence from benefit incidence of public spending in developing
countries (Chu et al. 2000, covering 55 such studies; see also the summary by Killick
2002) highlights some important findings. In the majority of cases, overall public
spending in each of the areas of education, health and transfer payments was found to be
progressive, but it was often poorly targeted, most often in sub-Saharan Africa. Health
spending was found to be progressive in all cases, but well targeted in only over a half.
Targeting was poorest in transition countries and sub-Saharan Africa, the latter fact
consistent with the findings reported by Castro-Leal et al. (1999), who survey several
African countries. This does not distinguish levels of health care, because many of the
studies reviewed do not. It may be that targeting is reasonably good for basic health
care, but poorer for higher level health care facilities, however, a study in Ghana in
1991–92 somewhat surprisingly found that spending on health centres and clinics is not
any better targeted on the poor than spending on hospitals (Demery et al. 1995).
How progressive and well-targeted education spending is also depends on the level
under consideration. Thus primary education is everywhere progressive and well-
targeted in many instances, although again the record of targeting is less good in Africa,
even at primary level (as also reported Castro-Leal et al. 1999). This poor targeting
becomes more apparent once allowance is made for the fact that poorer groups often
have more school-aged children, something many benefit incidence studies do not do.
Of course this reflects differences in enrolment rates according to the income group. As
a consequence of this, spending on secondary education in Africa is still less well
targeted to the poor. However, in Asia and Latin America spending on secondary
education is quite well targeted (Killick 2002); this is partly a consequence of the higher
overall level of secondary enrolment in these regions. It is clear that measures to raise
enrolment rates among the poor are essential in Africa. However, quality is also a key
factor here, with recent evidence suggesting that this is better for richer groups (World
Bank 2000) – this is likely to be part of the explanation for differential enrolment rates,
and so poorly targeted education spending. Finally, in the vast majority of countries the
direct benefits of spending in higher education accrue predominantly to those in the
richest groups; again patterns of enrolment lie behind this.
As might be expected, public spending on transfers is more likely to benefit poorer
groups disproportionately where measures are designed to build targeting into their
delivery (such as food stamps in Jamaica; Grosh 1995a and 1995b). Otherwise they are
often not well targeted, even if progressive (Chu et al. 2000).6
Much more limited evidence is available on the distributional impact of taxation, though
it is commonly argued that at the present time in low income countries the ability of
taxation to be progressive is limited (Killick 2002). This is partly a consequence of the
limited tax base, but is also a consequence of administrative difficulties. The common
practice of establishing independent revenue authorities in many countries is intended to
strengthen administrative procedures, and some anecdotal evidence suggests that this
may have had a favourable distributional impact in some cases.
Very few studies have considered the overall incidence of fiscal policy, considering
both spending and taxation. One exception though is the study for the Philippines by
Devarajan and Hossain (1995). They find that the overall pattern of incidence was
progressive; the tax system was broadly neutral but the pattern of public spending was
progressive. As the authors themselves admit, they were required to make a number of
strong assumptions in doing this; however they argue that their results are nonetheless
likely to be robust to changes in some of these assumptions.
3.2 Assessment of the benefit incidence approach
The benefit incidence method has the advantage of being direct and easily understood. It
does not require modelling and its data requirements are relatively modest. When the
standard of living is measured in money-metric terms, it can be used to quantify the
benefits or costs of the fiscal policy measure in the same terms. It is therefore possible
to assess how substantial its effects are in this sense.
But the approach also suffers from a number of substantial limitations (van de Walle
1998). Some of these are general problems that any method of evaluating the poverty
impact of fiscal policy will face:
i) It cannot be easily applied to fiscal measures the poverty impacts of which may
be quite indirect (e.g. increased spending on infrastructure in a region) or
general equilibrium in nature, and it is difficult to take account of longer term
or dynamic impacts.
Other limitations though are specific to this technique:
ii) As usually applied it is a static method, using data from and looking at impacts
at a point in time. However, it can be applied to looking at changes over time
(Hammer et al. 1995, do this in a study of social sector expenditures in
Malaysia).
iii) The method focuses on the average incidence, whereas it is the marginal
incidence that is relevant for assessing the distributional consequences of
changes in fiscal policy. This point is very important for policy purposes; even
where the average benefits for the poor from an existing programme may be
relatively low compared to richer groups, the poor may benefit
disproportionately from an expansion of that programme (if richer groups are
already sending all their children to school for example) and may suffer
disproportionately from any contractions. This is especially so where the
political economy is such that richer groups are able to capture the benefits of
existing public programmes more quickly than poorer groups. In this case
richer groups are more likely to have reached their desired level of7
consumption of these public goods than poorer groups, and so may respond
less than poorer groups to changes in the scale of the programme (Lanjouw
and Ravallion 1999). In other words, in such a case richer groups may have a
relatively low marginal incidence to this spending, while poorer groups have a
higher one. Estimates of marginal incidence of public works and other
programmes across states in India (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999) indicate that
these effects can be important in practice, and there are similar patterns in
other countries (Ravallion 2002). This means that extreme care is need in
drawing conclusions from estimates of the average incidence of fiscal policy
measures.
iv) One of the most serious limitations of the method is its complete failure to
consider the counterfactual – what would have happened in the absence of the
fiscal policy measure. This is closely related to the previous point, and can be
quite important in practice. If taxes or subsidies are changed this is likely to
affect the quantity consumed of that and other commodities; this is not allowed
for in the benefit incidence approach, but can have important consequences for
welfare or nutritional consequences. If public education was not subsidised
individuals might or might not send their children to school – this ought to
affect the assessment of the benefit of the subsidy. If unemployed household
heads did not receive cash transfers from the government then they may
instead have received transfers from another household; if so the state transfers
may crowd out private transfers. If this happens, and the household that had
been making the transfer was relatively well off, then the distributional benefit
of the introduction of the government transfers is different from what it
appears at first sight. In other words, consideration of the counterfactual can
significantly affect the assessment of who the true beneficiaries of the state
transfers are (and so their impact on poverty).
v) The methodology is based on monetary measures of living standards, so only
capturing one dimension. In addition, the monetary impacts will often not be
the object of greatest interest; for instance nutritional outcomes may be of
greatest interest in evaluating food subsidies (also the nutritional effects may
be somewhat bigger and more important). This problem partly arises from the
static nature of the method, using data from a single point in time. Thus for
example examining correlations between health status outcomes and use of
public health facilities provides no information on the impact of the former on
the latter; what is required rather is to know how health outcomes changed as a
result of a change in the level of health expenditure. Poverty monitoring
systems to some extent seek to do this.
Some additional limitations of the approach apply specifically to its use in assessing
provision of public goods and subsidised social education and health.
vi) It cannot be applied as described above if the beneficiaries cannot be identified
or if unit costs cannot be estimated (van de Walle 1998). For some purposes
partial information can still be useful. For example knowing how levels and
patterns of primary school enrolment in public schools vary across different
groups still enables an assessment of whether the poor (who could be defined
according to different criteria) benefit in proportion to other groups. But of
course this does not require a full benefit incidence analysis. Further, the
magnitude of the benefits is not quantified given that unit cost information is8
not available. For some purposes this may not matter, but for others it will, for
example if one wants to consider the poverty impact of a reallocation of a
given level of education expenditure between different levels (primary,
secondary, higher).
vii) Its measure of ‘benefit’ of a service is simply a measure of the cost of
providing it; its true benefit to the recipient may be significantly greater or less,
and may be better observed based by looking at other dimensions of living
standards. In addition, the unit cost concept takes no direct account of quality.
Where quality is poor the true benefits (e.g. in terms of improved health status,
or in terms of acquiring basic literacy) may be much less; and quality is not
just related to the unit cost of provision.
viii) Most importantly in this context, it does not offer any analysis or explanation
as to why some households do not use a facility. There may be many reasons
for this: quality of the service provided, ease of access, costs involved in using
the service, perception of lack of need, and so on. Yet this is exactly the type of
information that is likely to be particularly useful for policy purposes (Castro-
Leal et al. 1999). In this and other respects benefit incidence analysis is only a
starting point, and by itself does not provide sufficient information for policy
decisions.
In summary benefit incidence analysis is relatively straightforward to conduct, and its
data requirements are relative modest assuming that the unit cost data can be obtained.
Public spending decisions in particular are frequently not considered sufficiently in
terms of their distributional impacts (the same is less true of taxation, although attempts
to actually identify the distributional impacts are still quite rare). Benefit incidence
analysis offers a relatively easily understood tool that can be used to identify key areas
where the benefits of public expenditure are failing to reach poorer groups, or where
poor groups bear too much of the incidence of taxation. For these purposes it can
represent a very useful tool, including in holding governments to account. But the
simplicity of the method is deceptive. It suffers from a number of fundamental
limitations, need extreme care in its interpretation and does not provide enough of a
basis by itself to inform policy change.
4 Incorporating behavioural responses
As discussed above, one fundamental weakness of the benefit incidence approach is its
failure to consider behavioural responses to fiscal policy measures, in other words how
individuals change their behaviour as a result, which they will almost inevitably do. An
understanding of this is fundamental to considering the counterfactual, in other words
how behaviour would have differed had fiscal policy been different, an important part of
assessing the welfare impact. This knowledge also implies consideration of the
marginal incidence of fiscal policy changes. Taking account of behavioural responses
helps in identifying the true impacts of fiscal policy. To do this will require a modelling
approach; it may also have different – generally more demanding – data requirements
than the benefit incidence approach. Examples of the types of behavioural responses
that are relevant are potential responses of labour supply or private inter-household
transfers to the receipt of state transfers, or increasing private expenditure on health care
facilities in response to the introduction of user charges.9
The general principle of modelling these behavioural responses is to make use of
differences in fiscal policy over time and/or space to examine their impact on welfare
outcomes for households or individuals, controlling for all other likely influences. This
calls for an econometric or at least an approach based on appropriate control groups.
The welfare measures here can be monetary or non-monetary; this modelling approach
tries to estimate the extent of variation in these welfare outcomes which results from the
fiscal policy measures. By modelling behaviour explicitly (household behaviour as well
as how fiscal policy influences the welfare outcomes) this gives a better measure of the
impact of the fiscal policy measures, assuming that behaviour is adequately modelled.
The latter though may be difficult in practice, due to both the complexity of the
behaviour to be modelled and possible limitations of data availability.
This issue is best illustrated by examples. Cox and Jimenez in a series of studies (1992,
1995, 1998) consider the determinants of private inter-household transfers, a key
informal social safety net in many countries, including examining the influence of
public transfers. For example in Peru (Cox and Jimenez 1992) they consider the
determinants of private inter-household transfers from young to old, finding that receipt
of state pensions has a negative influence on such transfers. Based on the coefficients of
their econometric model, they argue that these transfers would be around 20 per cent
higher in the absence of state pensions. As discussed above, this information on the
private responses of households obviously affects the assessment of the distributional
incidence of state pensions. It is likely that the responses of private inter-household
transfers would make the true incidence of public transfers less progressive (in that the
effect of the public transfers has been to reduce private transfers that might otherwise
have been made by mainly non-poor households).
Similarly, the issue of the impact of public transfers on labour supply has been widely
studied. For example, modelling the determinants of labour supply in Sri Lanka, Sahn
and Alderman (1995) find that when households receive a targeted food subsidy (a rice
ration in this case) this has a significant negative impact on labour supply. Again they
simulate the quantitative magnitude of this based on the estimated coefficient values,
and suggest that the rice ration programme may reduce labour supply by two or three
days per month. Of course, this does not necessarily imply that its impact is welfare
reducing.
Studying the impact of government spending on health in Indonesia, Deolalikar (1995)
conducts a regression analysis of the determinants of demands for health inputs and of
health outcomes; among the determinants is included provincial recurrent government
expenditure per capita on health. Such analysis can be used to model the impact of
government pspending on different groups of households distinguished according to
their characteristics, impacts that may differ according to a household’s income group
for example. A broadly similar approach has been used to study the impact of user
charges on health-seeking behaviour (e.g. Gertler et al. 1987), where the impact of this
may again differ according to income group (there is quite a lot of evidence in this and
other contexts that poorer households’ demand are often more price elastic).
Many such studies have been based on cross-section household surveys that collect the
necessary information. Such approaches can applied to non-monetary as well as
monetary measures of welfare, and can quantify the effects of fiscal policy interventions
in either case. But the strengths of the approach depend on the accuracy with which
behavioural responses are indeed estimated. Issues of simultaneity or omitted variable
bias can be very important in this type of analysis and can affect the results10
substantially. An example of where this might be important is where fiscal policy
measures take the form of programmes in particular areas (e.g. school feeding
programmes) placed in areas of particular need (high child malnutrition). In this
instance a cross-sectional comparison between child malnutrition and presence of a
school feeding programme is meaningless and fundamentally misleading without
controlling for the programme placement effect (van de Walle 1998). This simultaneity
issue will arise any time where the presence or extent of the fiscal policy measure is
related to the welfare measure being modelled. Such effects can cause substantial biases
to the results and can lead to non-trivial changes in the estimated magnitudes of the
effects. This is not just a technical econometric point; such issues can then be very
important in practice in drawing conclusions to inform policy.
Critically important then is the accuracy with which behavioural responses are
estimated, in particular the extent to which it is possible to control for other factors to
enable a meaningful comparison with the control groups identified. In addition, the data
requirements for implementing this method in a way that the results command
confidence are likely to be somewhat greater than for the benefit incidence method. For
example, panel data or repeated cross sections of data generally enable better control for
extraneous factors so enabling the actual effects of the fiscal policy to be discerned
more accurately.
In summary, approaches based on modelling the behaviour of individuals and
households overcome several of the problems associated with the more straightforward
benefit incidence approach. But it is somewhat more complex to implement in practice.
There may be several different behavioural responses to be modelled (e.g. responses of
labour supply, inter-household transfers etc.) to many changes in fiscal policy, and
modelling each may be a significant undertaking. Besides this the data requirements are
likely to be somewhat greater.
5 Additional perspectives in assessing and enhancing the poverty impact of fiscal
policy
While household surveys are an important source of information in identifying the
distributional impact of fiscal policy they often cannot provide a sufficient
understanding of the underlying explanations for this. Yet this understanding is essential
in order to increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy in reducing poverty, especially
where this is the case in apparently pro-poor components such as spending on primary
education or basic health care. In general this will require additional information.
Thus household survey data may identify that primary school attendance is lower for
poorer households than for richer groups, but may not offer a sufficient explanation as
to why. This understanding is important because it is these differential enrolment rates
that underlie the unequal distribution of the benefits of spending in what might be
perceived to be a pro-poor area of public spending. In particular it is important to know
if it reflects supply factors (such as where schooling is available, its quality or its
accessibility), demand factors (parents not wanting to send their children to school,
which in turn may reflect various factors) or both? The answer to this has important
implications for the policy measures necessary for the poor to be included more in the
benefits of this spending.11
Retaining the primary school example, explanations for the observed patterns of
enrolment can often be obtained from other sources. Where household surveys are
complemented, as they often are, by community surveys collecting information on local
infrastructure and amenities, this may provide a partial explanation if for instance this
showed that the nearest school is more than 5 km away. Administrative data from the
Ministry of Education may also help in regard to the location of schools and the number
of teachers, if the information is sufficiently up to date. Budget information could also
help if it were available at a sufficiently geographically disaggregated level.
Ultimately though local communities themselves are best placed to provide insights as
to why they do or do not benefit from fiscal policy measures, especially those delivered
at a local level such as primary education, basic health care or agricultural extension. A
qualitative or less structured approach is generally a better source for such information.
Participatory Poverty Assessments can identify important explanations for behavior
which often would not be picked up through other means (Norton et al. 2001), for
example regarding the absence of teachers, the lack of school books or equipment, or, in
the case of health centres, the practice of illegal charging. This offers an important
reality check on information suggested by administrative data or large scale surveys.
A major advantage of such techniques is their local level focus. Ultimately a lot of the
most potentially pro-poor items of government spending (such as primary education,
basic health care and agricultural extension) are delivered at the local level. And this
will be the case increasingly in a context of decentralization in many countries.
Consequently measures to ensure effective delivery to the facilities supplying the
service, and then their effective use, play a key role in increasing the effectiveness of
public spending in reducing poverty.
Recent experience in Uganda offers important examples of this, notably through its
service delivery surveys and public expenditure tracking surveys (Mackinnon and
Reinikka 2000), which have been important inputs into public spending decisions. The
expenditure tracking survey is of particular interest because (in the absence of local
government accounts) it assessed the extent to which budgetary allocations for public
primary education and basic health care facilities reached the intended beneficiaries. In
the case of education this showed that over the period 1991–95 less than 20 per cent of
the budget for non-salary expenditures ever reached the schools, with district authorities
retaining much of the budget intended for schools. In the case of health, the survey was
less successful in being able to track expenditures. However, interviews at the clinics
showed that medicines generally reached the centres, but there was extensive evidence
from focus group discussions that staff often expropriated medicines and supplies and
sold them on. In both cases the key issue was poor governance and lack of
accountability. But results from such initiatives can be a very powerful tool in
improving financial flows to intended beneficiaries as was achieved in Uganda
(Mackinnon and Reinikka 2000); the availability of information about resource flows
played a key role.
Local level participatory and other surveys have the disadvantage of not being
nationally representative, but for some purposes this is not very important (as in the
example of the public expenditure tracking above). Also experience with the Uganda
Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) and other participatory poverty
assessments such as recently in Rwanda, indicates the ability of local level information
to influence policy priorities, including in the area of public spending. However, it is12
still possible to collect information on service quality or delivery for instance on a
national basis; one means of doing this is the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire
(CWIQ), a light household survey which includes questions on perceptions of public
service delivery. Because this is a light survey, it is more feasible to use it to collect
information at the district level, something which has generally not been feasible with
conventional surveys but which is increasingly important in the context of
decentralization.
Finally, another important factor in making fiscal policy more pro-poor is to create the
incentives at national and local level for governments to deliver more effectively to the
poor. This issue of designing appropriate incentives is still very much underdeveloped.
One example, again from Uganda, has been via the use of its Poverty Action Fund
(PAF). One of the most effective ways for Government Ministries to increase their
spending is to argue that it qualifies for the PAF (Mackinnon and Reinikka 2000). As
spending under the PAF is tightly monitored, with a significant civil society
involvement, this is intended to make this marginal spending more effective in
delivering poverty reduction.
6 Monitoring the poverty impact of fiscal policy
As well as identifying the impact of different components of fiscal policy at a point in
time, it is equally important to monitor the effects of fiscal policy on poverty over time.
This is most frequently considered in terms of different components of public spending,
with PRSP monitoring strategies based on input, output or intermediate and outcome
targets (World Bank 2002, Booth and Lucas 2001). Taking the example of health care
for instance, the standard input indicator would be public spending on health care,
available from budget data. Ideally this should be available at the most geographically
disaggregated level possible. Examples of output indicators could include utilisation
rates for health centres, the extent to which they are fully staffed, the availability of
drugs and so on. Typically this type of information would be available from government
administrative data, and again it is important to look at this at the most disaggregated
level possible. Often though the quality of this administrative data is fairly patchy, poor
quality, of sometimes out of date; and also it will not cover the private sector (which
may play an important role). Information on service delivery may also be relevant here.
Examples of outcome indicators include measures such as infant mortality or life
expectancy; these will typically be measured infrequently, based on surveys for
example.
Disaggregation by income group (relevant for considering the distributional pattern of
spending) can be done most easily at the outcome level, as is also the case for other
relevant disaggregations such as gender. However, it is also possible to consider
distributional factors in considering the input and output indicators. For instance if it is
known initially that the infant mortality rate is highest in a particular region, this can
provide a signal to increase spending disproportionately in this region and also to set
more demanding targets for the output indicators. This is important because in most
cases the input and intermediate indicators can be monitored much more frequently than
the outcome indicators – in other words, distributional issues can only be considered
explicitly relatively infrequently. Again though the issue of creating incentives is
important here.13
A monitoring framework does allow an assessment of the effectiveness of public
spending in achieving desired outcomes, and in assessing the distribution of these
outcomes. How effective and meaningful a monitoring framework is depends on the
successful identification of the indicators, that is on the extent to which the input
indicators do indeed relate to intermediate indicators and these in turn to the outcome
indicators. But given that, many of the issues discussed in Section 5 above are likely to
play a key role in ensuring an effective monitoring tool for assessing the impact of fiscal
policy on poverty (and more generally). At the input level it is important to assess the
extent to which government spending in areas to be delivered at local level actually
reaches the local level facilities. Community based monitoring using qualitative
methods is likely to be of particular importance for intermediate and outcome
objectives, and offers the additional advantage of a potentially independent means of
monitoring not dependent on government generated data.
7 Conclusions
Fiscal policy is important both for growth and for distribution, the latter both in a static
and dynamic sense. This paper has focused much more on its impact on distribution, an
issue which has been insufficiently considered in most countries. This is partly because
the administrative data collected by government ministries almost invariably does not
contain information on the living conditions of the beneficiaries or those paying the
taxes. However, the increasing availability of household survey data in most countries
has enabled much more consideration of poverty and distributional issues in general. In
addition though, such surveys frequently contain sufficient information to assess the
distributional impact of many of the more important components of fiscal policy, both
on the spending and taxation side. This has most often been considered through benefit
incidence analysis, and has shown that while fiscal policy is often progressive or
neutral, it is often not well targeted to the poor, this being especially the case in Africa.
Benefit incidence analysis represents an important and valuable source means of
assessing the distributional impact of fiscal policy. At the same time though it does have
a number of important conceptual and practical limitations, in particular as a guide to
policy. Thus for instance, the fact that the poor may not benefit proportionately from an
existing level of public spending in a given area (say health care) does not imply that
they would not suffer (benefit) disproportionately from a reduction (increase) in the
level of spending. Further, it does not model how beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
respond to changes in fiscal policy, an important factor in considering its distributional
incidence; this can though be modelled based on survey data.
Important as household survey data are for assessing the distributional impact of fiscal
policy, they alone are insufficient to understand why the pattern is as it is, and what
might be done about it. Alternative sources of information, especially those based at the
local level, and including participatory poverty assessments, service delivery surveys
and expenditure tracking surveys have an important role to play. Non-provision of
services or poor quality is likely to play an important role in explaining the observed
distributional patterns. This issue is equally important in seeking to monitor the impact
of fiscal policy on poverty.14
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